Measuring voting power in convex policy spaces
| Autor: | Sascha Kurz |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2013 |
| Předmět: |
FOS: Computer and information sciences
Banzhaf index Computer science 91A12 91B12 91A06 media_common.quotation_subject Economics Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous) Binary number jel:E Development jel:I jel:F Power (social and political) power multiple levels of approval jel:J Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory Voting jel:Q group decision making Economics ddc:330 jel:O Single peaked preferences Shapley-Shubik index nucleolus media_common Banzhaf power index Group (mathematics) lcsh:HB71-74 Regular polygon convex policy space lcsh:Economics as a science Group decision-making single peaked preferences simple games Mathematical economics Economic problem Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) |
| Zdroj: | Economies, Vol 2, Iss 1, Pp 45-77 (2014) Economies Volume 2 Issue 1 Pages 45-77 |
| Popis: | Classical power index analysis considers the individual's ability to influence the aggregated group decision by changing its own vote, where all decisions and votes are assumed to be binary. In many practical applications we have more options than either "yes" or "no". Here we generalize three important power indices to continuous convex policy spaces. This allows the analysis of a collection of economic problems like e.g. tax rates or spending that otherwise would not be covered in binary models. 31 pages, 9 tables |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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