Pareto efficient income taxation without single-crossing

Autor:	Spencer Bastani, Luca Micheletto, Sören Blomquist
Rok vydání:	2020
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics 050208 finance Economics 05 social sciences Pareto principle Characterization (mathematics) Microeconomics Income tax 0502 economics and business International political economy Nationalekonomi 050207 economics Set (psychology) Social Sciences (miscellaneous) Public finance Social policy
Zdroj:	Social Choice and Welfare. 55:547-594
ISSN:	1432-217X 0176-1714
DOI:	10.1007/s00355-020-01257-z
Popis:	We provide a full characterization of a two-type optimal nonlinear income tax model where the single-crossing condition is violated due to an assumption that agents differ both in terms of market abilities and in terms of their needs for a work-related good. We set up a Pareto-efficient tax problem and analyze the entire second-best Pareto-frontier, highlighting several non-standard results, such as the possibility of income re-ranking relative to the laissez-faire and gaps in the Pareto-frontier.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::83b35b359cff2a3e30c2bec2bb08363d https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01257-z Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
Nepřihlášeným uživatelům se plný text nezobrazuje	K zobrazení výsledku je třeba se přihlásit.