An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value

Autor:	Michela Chessa, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Aymeric Lardon, Takashi Yamada
Jazyk:	angličtina
Rok vydání:	2023
Předmět:	History Polymers and Plastics Shapley value Bargaining procedures Business and International Management Experiments Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering Nash program
Zdroj:	Games and Economic Behavior. 141:88-104
ISSN:	1090-2473
Popis:	Chessa M., Hanaki N., Lardon A., et al. An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value. Games and Economic Behavior 141, 88 (2023); https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.010. We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-based Winter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell mechanism better induces players to cooperate and to agree on an efficient outcome, whereas the demand-based Winter mechanism better implements allocations that reflect players' effective power, provided that the grand coalition is formed.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::83587faf71ae8751e026604ae606ba0d https://hdl.handle.net/11094/92343 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full Text from ScienceDirect