Agency-Theory and Internal-Labor-Market Explanations of Bonus Payments: Empirical Evidence from Spanish Firms
| Autor: | Pedro Ortín-Ángel, Vicente Salas-Fumás |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 1998 |
| Předmět: |
Labour economics
Economics and Econometrics Public economics media_common.quotation_subject Economic sector Strategy and Management Principal–agent problem Middle management Internal labor market Payment General Business Management and Accounting Promotion (rank) Incentive Management of Technology and Innovation Economics Empirical evidence media_common |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 7:573-613 |
| ISSN: | 1530-9134 1058-6407 |
| Popis: | This paper combines agency theory and internal-labor-market theories to explain the determinants of bonus payments among a large sample of top and middle managers from Spanish firms. A distinction is made between the decision whether to pay bonus or not and the size of the bonus. The empirical evidence confirms that the two decisions are determined by different factors. The results of the analysis show a trade-off between short-term and long-term incentives (bonuses and promotion opportunities) as well as differences in the pattern of compensation policies across economic sectors and functional areas inside the firm. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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