An axiomatic characterization of the Slater rule

Autor:	Mohsen Pourpouneh, Ton Storcken, Burak Can
Přispěvatelé:	Data Analytics and Digitalisation, RS: FSE DACS Mathematics Centre Maastricht, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory, RS: GSBE Theme Conflict & Cooperation
Jazyk:	angličtina
Rok vydání:	2021
Předmět:	PROXIMITY Economics and Econometrics Monotone polygon Economics International political economy Decision rule Characterization (mathematics) Mathematical economics Social Sciences (miscellaneous) Axiom Public finance
Zdroj:	Social Choice and Welfare, 56(4), 835-853. Springer, Cham
ISSN:	0176-1714
Popis:	Despite being a well-studied decision rule, the Slater rule has not been analyzed axiomatically. In this paper, we show that it is the only rule which is unbiased, monotone, tournamental, tie-breaking, and gradual. Thereby we provide a characterization of it for the first time. We also show these axioms to be logically independent.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::82c39eacc4cccface366f6b5c681d62d https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/8e4969a8-2999-4142-b4d0-2aae725cc40e Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full text from SpringerLink