Introducing managerial attention allocation in incentive contracts
| Autor: | Ricard Gil, Jordi Mondria |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2011 |
| Předmět: |
rational inattention
L14 Returns to scale Principal (computer security) incentive contracts Anreizvertrag Rationales Verhalten Task (project management) Führungskräfte Microeconomics monitoring Incentive ddc:330 Economics Benchmark (computing) Production (economics) attention allocation Vertragstheorie Rational inattention D86 General Economics Econometrics and Finance Public finance |
| Zdroj: | SERIEs. 2:335-358 |
| ISSN: | 1869-4195 1869-4187 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s13209-011-0059-2 |
| Popis: | This paper introduces and studies the role of managerial attention allocation constraints in incentive contracts. We extend the traditional moral-hazard benchmark model with multi-tasking and linear incentive contracts by letting the principal choose the amount of monitoring allocated across tasks. In our model, more attention allocated to a task improves the task contractibility and consequently increases the effort provided by the agent. Our findings show that, even under symmetry, in the presence of increasing returns to scale in either production or monitoring the principal may optimally offer an unbalanced incentive contract while allocating different amounts of attention across tasks. Finally, we comment on the empirical content of our model. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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