Frequent Financial Reporting and Managerial Myopia

Autor:	Arthur Kraft, Rahul Vashishtha, Mohan Venkatachalam
Rok vydání:	2017
Předmět:	Finance Economics and Econometrics 050208 finance business.industry 05 social sciences 050201 accounting Short termism Investment (macroeconomics) HG Investment decisions Accounting 0502 economics and business Business
Zdroj:	The Accounting Review. 93:249-275
ISSN:	1558-7967 0001-4826
DOI:	10.2308/accr-51838
Popis:	Using the transition of U.S. firms from annual reporting to semi-annual reporting and then to quarterly reporting over the period 1950–1970, we provide evidence on the effects of increased reporting frequency on firms' investment decisions. Estimates from difference-in-differences specifications indicate that increased reporting frequency is associated with an economically large decline in investments. Additional analyses reveal that the decline in investments is most consistent with frequent financial reporting inducing myopic management behavior. Our evidence informs the recent controversial debate about eliminating quarterly reporting for U.S. corporations. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; G30; G31.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8189807c18bb014cabb43a2e7d397f42 https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-51838 Zobrazit plný text záznamu