Exacerbating the Tragedy of the Commons: Private Inefficient Outcomes and Peer Effect in Experimental Games with Fishing Communities
Autor: | Rocio del Pilar Moreno-Sanchez, Jorge Higinio Maldonado |
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Jazyk: | angličtina |
Rok vydání: | 2016 |
Předmět: |
Behavioral Economics
Economics lcsh:Medicine Social Sciences Transportation tragedy of the commons 010501 environmental sciences Behavioral economics 01 natural sciences Resource (project management) Psychology Cooperative Behavior lcsh:Science media_common Multidisciplinary Applied Mathematics Fishes TheoryofComputation_GENERAL Agriculture Experimental economics Transportation Infrastructure Models Economic Physical Sciences symbols Engineering and Technology Independent Living Games Game theory Research Article TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS Competitive Behavior Experimental Economics Social Psychology media_common.quotation_subject Fisheries Models Psychological Civil Engineering Peer Group Scarcity Microeconomics symbols.namesake Game Theory 0103 physical sciences Animals Humans 010306 general physics 0105 earth and related environmental sciences Behavior lcsh:R Tragedy of the commons Biology and Life Sciences Peer group Roads Games Experimental Nash equilibrium Recreation lcsh:Q Mathematics |
Zdroj: | PLoS ONE PLoS ONE, Vol 11, Iss 2, p e0148403 (2016) |
ISSN: | 1932-6203 |
Popis: | "Economic Experimental Games have shown that individuals make decisions that deviate down from the suboptimal Nash equilibrium. However, few studies have analyzed the case when deviation is above the Nash equilibrium. Extracting from above the Nash equilibrium is inefficient not only socially but also privately and it would exacerbate the tragedy of the commons. That would be the case of a race to the fish when stocks are becoming depleted or driver behavior on a highly congested road. The objective of this study is to analyze private inefficient extraction behavior in experimental games and to associate the type of player and the type of player group with such inefficient outcomes. To do this, we carried out economic experimental games with local coastal fishermen in Colombia, using a setting where the scarcity of the resource allows for an interior Nash equilibrium and inefficient over-extraction is possible. The state of the resource, the type of player and the composition of the group explain, in part, this inefficient behavior." |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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