Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets
| Autor: | Qianqian Kong, Hans Peters |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | QE Math. Economics & Game Theory, RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, RS: FSE DACS Mathematics Centre Maastricht |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2023 |
| Předmět: |
Information Systems and Management
Matching markets General Computer Science STABILITY Social Choice Clubs Committees Associations Management Science and Operations Research Cooperative Games GAMES Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering c71 - Cooperative Games Modeling and Simulation Power indices JOHNSTON COLLEGE ADMISSIONS Bargaining Theory Matching Theory Networks EFFECTIVITY Roommate problems Game theory |
| Zdroj: | European Journal of Operational Research, 306(1), 448-456. Elsevier |
| ISSN: | 0377-2217 |
| Popis: | We study situations where agents can form or sever links in a network: what agents can do exactly is de-scribed by effectivity functions. A power index assigns to such an effectivity function a number for each agent, measuring the opportunities of that agent. We characterize a class of power indices by four ax-ioms: the Transfer Property, the Dummy Property, Symmetry, and Network Neutrality. As a corollary, we obtain power indices for the case where effectivity functions are induced by preferences of agents about the other agents. Applications include one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many matching markets, as well as roommate problems.(c) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
Full Text from ScienceDirect