Cooperation in Strategic Games Revisited*
| Autor: | Adam Tauman Kalai, Ehud Kalai |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2013 |
| Předmět: |
Scheme (programming language)
C71 C72 C78 [Cooperative Games Noncooperative Games Bargaining Theory JEL Classification Numbers] Economics and Econometrics Class (set theory) Generalization 05 social sciences Microeconomics 0502 economics and business Decomposition (computer science) Economics Arbitration Complete theory 050207 economics Transferable utility Mathematical economics computer Axiom 050205 econometrics computer.programming_language |
| Zdroj: | The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 128:917-966 |
| ISSN: | 1531-4650 0033-5533 |
| DOI: | 10.1093/qje/qjs074 |
| Popis: | For two-person complete-information strategic games with transferable utility, all major variable-threat bargaining and arbitration solutions coincide. This confluence of solutions by luminaries such as Nash, Harsanyi, Raiffa, and Selten, is more than mere coincidence. Staying in the class of two-person games with transferable unility, the article presents a more complete theory that expands their solution. Specifically, it presents: (1) a decomposition of a game into cooperative and competitive components, (2) an intuitive and computable closed-form formula for the solution, (3) an axiomatic justification of the solution, and (4) a generalization of the solution to games with private signals, along with an arbitration scheme that implements it. The objective is to restart research on cooperative solutions to strategic games and their applications. JEL Codes: C71, C72, C78. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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