Pretending in Dynamic Games, Alternative Outcomes and Application to Electricity Markets
Autor: | George P. Papavassilopoulos, Ioannis Kordonis, Alexandros C. Charalampidis |
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Přispěvatelé: | Institut d'Électronique et des Technologies du numéRique (IETR), Université de Nantes (UN)-Université de Rennes (UR)-Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Rennes (INSA Rennes), Institut National des Sciences Appliquées (INSA)-Institut National des Sciences Appliquées (INSA)-CentraleSupélec-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), National Technical University of Athens [Athens] (NTUA), This research has been cofinanced by the European Union (European Social Fund—ESF) and Greek nationalfunds through the Operational Program 'Education and Lifelong Learning' of the National StrategicReference Framework (NSRF)—Research Funding Program: THALES. Investing in knowledge societythrough the European Social Fund and the program ARISTEIA, project name HEPHAISTOS., Nantes Université (NU)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Rennes (INSA Rennes), Institut National des Sciences Appliquées (INSA)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Institut National des Sciences Appliquées (INSA)-CentraleSupélec-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université de Nantes (UN)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1) |
Jazyk: | angličtina |
Rok vydání: | 2018 |
Předmět: |
Statistics and Probability
0209 industrial biotechnology Economics and Econometrics Sequential game Learning/Adaptation in Games 02 engineering and technology Competition (economics) Microeconomics symbols.namesake 020901 industrial engineering & automation Market mechanism Order (exchange) 0502 economics and business Stackelberg competition Economics [INFO.INFO-SY]Computer Science [cs]/Systems and Control [cs.SY] Electricity market Manipulation 050205 econometrics [INFO.INFO-GT]Computer Science [cs]/Computer Science and Game Theory [cs.GT] Applied Mathematics 05 social sciences Pretending Electricity Markets Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design Bounded rationality Computer Science Applications Computational Mathematics Computational Theory and Mathematics Nash equilibrium Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information symbols [MATH.MATH-OC]Mathematics [math]/Optimization and Control [math.OC] Mathematical economics |
Zdroj: | Dynamic Games and Applications Dynamic Games and Applications, 2018, 8 (4), pp.844-873. ⟨10.1007/s13235-017-0229-3⟩ Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer Verlag, 2018, 8 (4), pp.844-873. ⟨10.1007/s13235-017-0229-3⟩ |
ISSN: | 2153-0785 2153-0793 |
Popis: | This work studies dynamic game situations with incomplete structural information, motivated by problems arising in electricity market modeling. Some adaptive/learning strategies are considered as an expression of the bounded rationality of the participants of the game. The adaptive strategies are typically not in Nash equilibrium. Thus, the possibility of manipulation appears. That is, a player may use the dynamic rule of the opponent in order to manipulate her. We focus on a smaller class of manipulating strategies, called pretending strategies, where each player acts as if she had different, not real, preferences. It turns out that under certain technical conditions, if only one player pretends, she can achieve the same cost as if she were the Stackelberg leader. The situation where all the players are pretending is then considered, and an auxiliary game, called pretenders’ game, is introduced. A class of quadratic games is then studied, and several relations among pretending and Stackelberg leadership are derived. A linear quadratic environmental game is also studied. We then study some competitive electricity market models. Particularly, a supply function model and the market mechanism described in Rasouli and Teneketzis (electricity pooling markets with strategic producers possessing asymmetric information ii: inelastic demand, arXiv: 1404.5539 , 2014) are considered. It turns out that pretending may increase competition or cooperation and in some cases pretending may cause behaviors making the system not working at all. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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