When Is Product Personalization Profit-Enhancing? A Behavior-Based Discrimination Model

Autor: Didier Laussel, Joana Resende
Přispěvatelé: Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques (AMSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Cef.up, Economics Department, University of Porto, Portuguese public funds [Project Reference NORTE-01-0145-FEDER028540], FCT (Fundacao para a Ciencia e a Tecnologia) [Project Reference POCI-010145-FEDER-006890], ANR-17-EURE-0020,AMSE (EUR),Aix-Marseille School of Economics(2017), ANR-11-IDEX-0001,Amidex,INITIATIVE D'EXCELLENCE AIX MARSEILLE UNIVERSITE(2011)
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2022
Předmět:
Zdroj: Management Science
Management Science, 2022, 68 (12), pp.8872-8888. ⟨10.1287/mnsc.2022.4298⟩
ISSN: 0025-1909
1526-5501
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4298⟩
Popis: This paper investigates duopoly competition when horizontally differentiated firms are able to make personalized product-price offers to returning customers, within a behavior-based discrimination model. In the second period, firms can profile old customers according to their preferences, selling them targeted products at personalized prices. Product-price personalization (PP) allows firms to retain all old customers, eliminating second-period customer poaching. The overall profit effects of PP are shown to be ambiguous. In the second period, PP improves the matching between customers’ preferences and firms’ offers, but firms do not make any revenues in the rival’s turf. In the Bertrand outcome, second-period profits only increase for both firms if the size of their old turfs are not too different or initial products are not too differentiated. However, the additional second-period profits may be offset by lower first-period profits. PP is likely to increase firms’ overall discounted profits when consumers’ (firms’) discount factor is low (high) and firms’ initial products are exogenous and sufficiently different. When the location of initial products is endogenous, profits are hurt because of an additional location (strategic) effect aggravating head-to-head competition in the first period. Likewise, when a fraction of active consumers conceals their identity, PP increases second-period profits at the cost of aggressive first-period price competition. Finally, we show that the room for profitable PP enlarges considerably if firms rely on PP as an effective device to sustain tacit collusive outcomes, with firms credibly threatening to respond to first-period price deviations with second-period aggressive relocations of their standard products. This paper was accepted by Matthew Shum, marketing. Funding: D. Laussel gratefully acknowledges support by the French National Research Agency [Grant ANR-17-EURE-0020] and the Excellence Initiative of Aix-Marseille University [Grant A*MIDEX]. J. Resende was supported by Portuguese public funds [Project Reference NORTE-01-0145-FEDER-028540] and through FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia) [Project Reference POCI-01-0145-FEDER-006890]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4298 .
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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