Promotions, Dismissals, and Employee Selection: Theory and Evidence

Autor: Anders Frederiksen, Elod Takats
Rok vydání: 2009
Předmět:
Zdroj: Frederiksen, A & Takáts, E 2011, ' Promotions, dismissals, and employee selection: Theory and evidence ', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 159-179 . https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewp017
ISSN: 1465-7341
8756-6222
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewp017
Popis: Firms offer highly complex contracts to their employees. These contracts contain a mix of incentives, such as fixed wages, bonus payments, promotion options, and dismissals or threats of dismissal. In this article, we show that firms having a production process that is sensitive to employee quality may find it optimal to combine cost-efficient incentives such as bonuses and promotions with dismissals. Based on this result, we derive a hierarchy of incentives. Furthermore, we demonstrate the close link between the optimal contract and the employee sorting and selection and use this to analyse the information conveyed in employment matches. Firms offer highly complex contracts to their employees. These contracts contain a mix of incentives, such as fixed wages, bonus payments, promotion options, and dismissals or threats of dismissal. In this article, we show that firms having a production process that is sensitive to employee quality may find it optimal to combine cost-efficient incentives such as bonuses and promotions with dismissals. Based on this result, we derive a hierarchy of incentives. Furthermore, we demonstrate the close link between the optimal contract and the employee sorting and selection and use this to analyse the information conveyed in employment matches.
Databáze: OpenAIRE