Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems
| Autor: | Johannes Spinnewijn, Frans Spinnewyn |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Předmět: |
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
H Social Sciences (General) Bargaining problem media_common.quotation_subject Compromise Resistance (psychoanalysis) Business economics Negotiation Economics Position (finance) QA Mathematics General Economics Econometrics and Finance Mechanism (sociology) Law and economics Simple (philosophy) media_common |
| Zdroj: | Review of Economic Design. 19:91-116 |
| ISSN: | 1434-4750 1434-4742 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10058-015-0168-7 |
| Popis: | We propose a simple mechanism which implements a unique solution to the bargaining problem with two players in subgame-perfect equilibrium. The mechanism incorporates two important features of negotiations; players can revise claims in an attempt to reach a compromise or pursue their claims in an ultimate take-it-or-leave-it offer. Players restrain their claims to avoid a weak bargaining position or their resistance to uncompromising behavior to acquire leadership. The Nash solution and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution are implemented in the extreme cases when respectively no and all revisions are allowed. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|