The role of persuasion in cultural evolution dynamics
Autor: | Fabrizio Panebianco |
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Rok vydání: | 2016 |
Předmět: |
Persuasion
Economics media_common.quotation_subject Cultural evolution 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Settore SECS-P/01 - ECONOMIA POLITICA Prisoner’s dilemma Econometrics and Finance (all)2001 Economics Competition (economics) Microeconomics Superrationality Stag hunt 0502 economics and business 050207 economics Cultural transmission in animals media_common 05 social sciences 06 humanities and the arts Social dilemma Prisoner's dilemma Dilemma Cooperation Cultural transmission Evolutionary selection Economics Econometrics and Finance (all)2001 Economics Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous) Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous) 060302 philosophy General Economics Econometrics and Finance Social psychology |
Zdroj: | International Review of Economics. 63:233-258 |
ISSN: | 1863-4613 1865-1704 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s12232-016-0253-4 |
Popis: | We analyze the evolution of a society in which types evolve not only depending on how much they are fit but also on how much they are able to persuade others about their fitness. This mechanism makes possible to reach equilibria not feasible under standard dynamics. We first provide necessary conditions for a generic matrix and generic class of cultural competition mechanisms in order to observe polymorphic equilibria, comparing it with the standard case. Then, necessary and sufficient conditions for polymorphic equilibrium stability are provided in the case of particular competition rule family, at each competition level. We show that some social dilemmas as prisoner’s dilemma or stag hunt can have their dynamics dramatically changed. We then analyze the prisoner’s dilemma framework finding that also full cooperation is sustainable in equilibrium. Finally we show that this persuasion mechanisms generally increase the equilibrium aggregate production of the society. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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