Observing and shaping the market: the dilemma of central banks

Autor: Bruno Ziliotto, Romain Baeriswyl, Camille Cornand
Přispěvatelé: Swiss National Bank, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision (CEREMADE), Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL), Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2016
Předmět:
Economics and Econometrics
coordination
Transparency (market)
JEL: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E5 - Monetary Policy
Central Banking
and the Supply of Money and Credit/E.E5.E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
overreaction
Financial system
Forward guidance
Outcome (game theory)
JEL: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E5 - Monetary Policy
Central Banking
and the Supply of Money and Credit/E.E5.E52 - Monetary Policy
Accounting
0502 economics and business
Economics
JEL: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
Heterogeneous information
050207 economics
E58
E52
ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS
050205 econometrics
heterogeneous information
transparency
Public information
050208 finance
Public economics
[QFIN]Quantitative Finance [q-fin]
05 social sciences
Information quality
[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
JEL codes
Dilemma
D82
Action (philosophy)
Market activity
endogenous information
Open market operation
Central bank
public information
Business
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information
Knowledge
and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
Finance
Zdroj: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Wiley, 2019, ⟨10.1111/jmcb.12682⟩
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Wiley, In press
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2019, ⟨10.1111/jmcb.12682⟩
ISSN: 0022-2879
1538-4616
Popis: International audience; While the central bank observes the market activity to assess economic fundamentals, it shapes the market outcome through its policy interventions. The more the central bank influences the market, the more it spoils the informational content of economic aggregates. How should the central bank act and communicate when it derives its information from observing the market? This paper analyses the optimal central bank's action and disclosure under endogenous central bank's information for three operational frameworks: pure communication, action and communication, and signaling action. When the central bank takes an action, it would be optimal for the central bank to be fully opaque to prevent its disclosure from deteriorating the information quality of market outcomes. However, in the realistic case where central bank's action is observable, it may be optimal to refrain from implementing any action.
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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