The segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdictions with a welfarist central government
| Autor: | Rémy Oddou, Nicolas Gravel, Rongili Biswas |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | EconomiX, Université Paris Nanterre (UPN)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Maulana Azad College, Department of Public Policy and Public Choice (POLIS), University of Eastern Piedmont, Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM), École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU), Théorie économique, modélisation et applications (THEMA), Université de Cergy Pontoise (UCP), Université Paris-Seine-Université Paris-Seine-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), HAL Nanterre, Administrateur |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2013 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Government CNRS 1 - AERES A Public economics Jurisdiction Economie Quantitative 05 social sciences 050301 education [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences Microeconomics Central government 0502 economics and business International political economy Economics 050207 economics [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance 0503 education Social Sciences (miscellaneous) Public finance Indifference curve |
| Zdroj: | Social Choice and Welfare Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2013, 41, pp.293-319 Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2013, 41 (2), pp.293-319. ⟨10.1007/s00355-012-0688-9⟩ Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, 41 (2), pp.293-319. ⟨10.1007/s00355-012-0688-9⟩ BASE-Bielefeld Academic Search Engine Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, 41, pp.293-319 |
| ISSN: | 0176-1714 1432-217X |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00355-012-0688-9⟩ |
| Popis: | International audience; This paper examines the segregative properties of Tiebout-type process of jurisdiction formation by freely mobile households in the presence of a central government which makes equalization transfers across jurisdictions so as to maximize a generalized utilitarian or a max–min objective. It is shown that the introduction of such a central government significantly affects the set of stable jurisdiction structures. It is also shown that the class of households additively separable preferences that guarantees the wealth segregation of any stable jurisdiction structure is unaffected by the presence of a central government if this government uses a generalized utilitarian objective. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013 |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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