Second-Person Engagement, Self-Alienation, and Group-Identification
| Autor: | Zahavi, D |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
Group-identification
media_common.quotation_subject Collective intentionality Alienation Empathy 0603 philosophy ethics and religion We-identity 050105 experimental psychology Presupposition Simulation theory of empathy Phenomenology (philosophy) 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences media_common Philosophy of science 05 social sciences 06 humanities and the arts Epistemology Reciprocal empathy Philosophy Recognition Second-person engagement 060302 philosophy Dyadic interaction Phenomenology Faculty of Humanities Psychology |
| Zdroj: | Zahavi, D 2019, ' Second-person engagement, self-alienation, and group-identification ', Topoi, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 251-260 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-016-9444-6 |
| ISSN: | 1572-8749 0167-7411 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11245-016-9444-6 |
| Popis: | One of the central questions within contemporary debates about collective intentionality concerns the notion and status of the we. The question, however, is by no means new. At the beginning of the last century, it was already intensively discussed in phenomenology. Whereas Heidegger argued that a focus on empathy is detrimental to a proper understanding of the we, and that the latter is more fundamental than any dyadic interaction, other phenomenologists, such as Stein, Walther and Husserl, insisted on the importance of empathy for proper we-experiences. In this paper, I will present some of the key moves in this debate and then discuss and assess Husserl’s specific proposal, according to which reciprocal empathy, second-person engagement and self-alienation are all important presuppositions for group-identification and we-identity. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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