Incentives and motivation in dynamic contests
| Autor: | Armin Schmutzler, Arnd Heinrich Klein |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | University of Zurich |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Economics and Econometrics Polarization (politics) Principal (computer security) 2002 Economics and Econometrics experiments 1407 Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management incentive systems CONTEST 330 Economics Microeconomics revenge effect Intimidation Incentive rank Simple (abstract algebra) 10007 Department of Economics Economics Dynamic contests order tournaments intimidation effect |
| DOI: | 10.5167/uzh-205754 |
| Popis: | This paper uses a contest setting to analyze the provision of intertemporal incentives in organizations. Should a principal repeatedly award small prizes or give a large prize that takes past performance into account? A simple theoretical model predicts higher efforts in the latter case. An experiment confirms this prediction, but the size of the effect is smaller than expected. This result reflects two observations of independent interest. First, there is a revenge effect for laggards in repeated contests: Laggards exert higher efforts than leaders with the same first-period effort level. Second, there is an intimidation effect for laggards in the single-prize case: Laggards exert lower efforts than leaders with the same first-period effort level. Moreover, we observe polarization in laggard behavior. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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