Corruption, environmental regulation and market entry
| Autor: | Marcel Thum, Amit K. Biswas |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Government Korruption Umweltpolitik Umweltgesetzgebung Markteintritt Economic policy Corruption media_common.quotation_subject Corruption environmental policy environmental legislation market entry 05 social sciences International economics Development 0502 economics and business ddc:320 ddc:330 Environmental regulation 050202 agricultural economics & policy Business Environmental policy 050207 economics General Environmental Science media_common |
| Popis: | The authors develop a simple analytical framework to study the welfare-maximizing environmental standards when market entry is endogenous and firms can circumvent regulation by bribing corrupt officials. Corruption changes the tradeoff in environmental policy. Corruption leads more polluting firms to enter into the market, which requires tighter environmental regulation. However, corruption also makes trading in some environmental protection for a marginally higher market entry optimal for the government. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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