Politicians in disguise and financial experts on the board: Evidence from Spanish cajas
| Autor: | Marcos Santamaría-Mariscal, Inigo Garcia-Rodriguez, M. Elena Romero-Merino, Pablo de Andrés |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | UAM. Departamento de Financiación e Investigación Comercial, Finanzas, Mercados y Gobierno Corporativo |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
G28
Economics and Econometrics 050208 finance Board composition Strategy and Management 05 social sciences Perspective (graphical) savings banks Public administration DUAL (cognitive architecture) General Business Management and Accounting Economía Politics financial experience Political science ddc:650 0502 economics and business G21 G34 cajas Business and International Management politicians 050203 business & management |
| Zdroj: | Biblos-e Archivo: Repositorio Institucional de la UAM Universidad Autónoma de Madrid Biblos-e Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la UAM instname |
| ISSN: | 2340-9444 |
| DOI: | 10.1177/2340944420924417 |
| Popis: | This study offers insight into the role of board politicization on the Spanish cajas’ performance from a dual perspective. First, we analyze the effect of a new kind of political directors who occupy board seats as representatives of stakeholders outside the public administrations while maintaining a political affiliation. We call these “hidden” political directors as politicians in disguise. Second, we analyze how political interests can prevent directors with financial expertise from applying their knowledge to improve cajas’ performance. Using a sample of hand-collected data from 45 Spanish cajas, we find that politicians in disguise destroy value in the caja and that politically motivated financial experts on the board do not benefit cajas’ performance. JEL CLASSIFICATION: G34, G21, G28 This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant ECO2017-85356) |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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