Out‐of‐Equilibrium Bids in First‐Price Auctions: Wrong Expectations or Wrong Bids
| Autor: | J. Philipp Reiß, Oliver Kirchkamp |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Microeconomics & Public Economics, Externe publicaties SBE, RS: GSBE ETBC |
| Rok vydání: | 2011 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
INFORMATION Risk aversion STATED BELIEFS Regret PLAY Best reply ASYMMETRIC AUCTIONS Public good PUBLIC-GOODS Test (assessment) Microeconomics BIDDING BEHAVIOR Winner's curse Economics Common value auction WINNERS CURSE PRICE AUCTIONS Internal validity PRIVATE-VALUE AUCTIONS NORMAL-FORM GAMES |
| Zdroj: | The Economic Journal, 121(557), 1361-1397. Oxford University Press |
| ISSN: | 1468-0297 0013-0133 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02455.x |
| Popis: | Deviations from risk-neutral equilibrium bids in auctions can be related to inconsistent expectations with correct best replies or correct expectations but deviant best replies (e.g. because of risk aversion, regret, quantal-response mistakes). To distinguish between these two explanations, we use a novel experimental procedure and study expectations together with best replies in symmetric and asymmetric auctions. We extensively test the internal validity of this setup. We find that deviations from equilibrium bids do not seem to be because of to wrong expectations but because of deviations from a risk-neutral best reply. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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