An axiomatic re-characterization of the Kemeny rule

Autor:	Mohsen Pourpouneh, Burak Can, Ton Storcken
Přispěvatelé:	Data Analytics and Digitalisation, RS: FSE DACS Mathematics Centre Maastricht, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory, RS: GSBE Theme Conflict & Cooperation, RS: GSBE MORSE
Jazyk:	angličtina
Rok vydání:	2022
Předmět:	and Voting Behavior d72 - Political Processes: Rent-seeking Political Processes: Rent-seeking Lobbying Axiomatic characterization Social Choice Clubs Committees Associations d72 - Political Processes: Rent-seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting Behavior Aggregation problem Decision rule Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General Characterization (mathematics) Elections Monotone polygon d71 - "Social Choice Associations" Preference aggregation d70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General Legislatures Kemeny rule General Economics Econometrics and Finance Mathematical economics Axiom Mathematics
Zdroj:	Review of Economic Design, 26(3), 447-467. Springer Verlag
ISSN:	1434-4742
DOI:	10.1007/s10058-021-00259-2
Popis:	The Kemeny rule is one of the well studied decision rules. In this paper we show that the Kemeny rule is the only rule which is unbiased, monotone, strongly tie-breaking, strongly gradual, and weighed tournamental. We show that these conditions are logically independent.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::6be19cc24d5d3def7d6228037b347dcd https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00259-2 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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