Against Person Essentialism
| Autor: | Eric T. Olson, Karsten Witt |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
010506 paleontology
Essentialism media_common.quotation_subject 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion medicine.disease 01 natural sciences Philosophy Nothing 060302 philosophy Personal identity medicine Dementia Psychology Social psychology 0105 earth and related environmental sciences media_common |
| ISSN: | 0026-4423 |
| Popis: | It is widely held that every person is a person essentially, where being a person is having special mental properties such as intelligence and self-consciousness. It follows that nothing can acquire or lose these properties. The paper argues that this rules out all familiar psychological-continuity views of personal identity over time. It also faces grave difficulties in accounting for the mental powers of human beings who are not intelligent and self-conscious, such as foetuses and those with dementia. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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