The Wait-and-See Option in Ascending Price Auctions

Autor:	Philippe Jehiel, Olivier Compte
Rok vydání:	2004
Předmět:	Microeconomics Business economics Incentive Drop out Perfect information Economics Vickrey auction TheoryofComputation_GENERAL Revenue Common value auction Social Sciences Economics Business & Economics General Economics Econometrics and Finance Valuation (finance)
Zdroj:	JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, 2 (2-3) pp. 494-503. (2004)
ISSN:	1542-4774 1542-4766
DOI:	10.1162/154247604323068177
Popis:	Ascending auctions offer agents the option to wait and see before deciding to drop out. We show that in contexts where as time proceeds agents get finer and finer estimates of their valuations, incentives to drop out at one’s expected valuation are weak: it is optimal for agents to wait and see. We first illustrate the claim in a private value setting. We next analyze an interdependent value setting in which this wait and see option results in an imperfect information aggregation. We also analyze the implications for the seller’s revenue, and show that the ascending format may dominate the second-price format, independently of the date at which the second price auction is run. (JEL: D44, D83)
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::686adb0e97341eac573ddf35a47e0288 https://doi.org/10.1162/154247604323068177 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF