Legitimacy challenges to the liberal world order: Evidence from United Nations speeches, 1970–2018
| Autor: | Erik Voeten, Alexander Kentikelenis |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Kentikelenis, Alexander [0000-0002-1543-4595], Apollo - University of Cambridge Repository |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
LIBERAL WORLD ORDER
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE UNITED NATIONS LEGITIMACY WORLD BANK IMF WTO Economics and Econometrics United Nations General assembly 0211 other engineering and technologies Public policy Context (language use) 02 engineering and technology WTO Article Insider Political science 050602 political science & public administration World Bank Global governance IMF Legitimacy ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS 44 Human Society 021110 strategic defence & security studies Government 05 social sciences Institutional economics Liberal world order 4408 Political Science 0506 political science 16 Peace Justice and Strong Institutions Political economy Political Science and International Relations |
| Zdroj: | The Review of International Organizations |
| ISSN: | 1559-744X 1559-7431 |
| Popis: | Funder: University of Cambridge The liberal international economic order has been facing high-profile legitimacy challenges in recent years. This article puts these challenges in historical context through a systematic analysis of rhetorical challenges towards both the order per se and specific global economic institutions. Drawing on Albert Hirschman’s classic typology of exit, voice and loyalty, we coded leaders’ speeches in the General Debate at the UN General Assembly between 1970 and 2018 as articulating intentions to abandon elements of the order, challenges or calls for reform, unequivocal support, or factual mentions of cooperation. Surprisingly, we find that explicit criticisms towards the liberal order are at an all-time low and that exit threats remain rare. An analysis of the historical evolution of criticisms to global economic institutions reveals a move away from the Cold War insider-outsider conflict towards insider contestation. For example, we find that as countries’ economies become more open, their leaders expressed more support for global economic institutions during the Cold War but less support since. Finally, we demonstrate consistency between the public policy positions leaders announce in UNGA General Debate speeches and their government positions on consequential reform debates on debt relief. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
Full text from SpringerLink