Divorce Laws and Divorce Rate in the U.S
| Autor: | Stefania Marcassa |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Théorie économique, modélisation et applications (THEMA), Université de Cergy Pontoise (UCP), Université Paris-Seine-Université Paris-Seine-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris School of Economics (PSE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE), École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Marcassa, Stefania, CY Cergy Paris Université (CY) |
| Rok vydání: | 2011 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
JEL: K - Law and Economics/K.K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law/K.K3.K36 - Family and Personal Law media_common.quotation_subject alimony and child support 02 engineering and technology divorce laws 01 natural sciences JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J1 - Demographic Economics/J.J1.J12 - Marriage • Marital Dissolution • Family Structure • Domestic Abuse Division of property age-specific divorce rate State (polity) 0502 economics and business Economics 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering 050207 economics 0101 mathematics [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance 10. No inequality ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS child custody 050205 econometrics media_common Age-specific divorce rate unilateral and consensual divorce divorce laws property division alimony and child support child custody 05 social sciences 010102 general mathematics Child custody Investment (macroeconomics) [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance 16. Peace & justice unilateral and consensual divorce jel:D13 Incentive Child support jel:J12 Law jel:K36 JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics/D.D1.D13 - Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation Marital status 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing Alimony Age-specific divorce rate unilateral and consensual divorce divorce laws property division alimony and child support child custody property division |
| Zdroj: | B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, 2013, 13 (1), pp.10.1515/bejm-2012-0149 The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, 2013, 13 (1), ⟨10.1515/bejm-2012-0149⟩ HAL |
| ISSN: | 1556-5068 1935-1690 2194-6116 |
| DOI: | 10.2139/ssrn.1974453 |
| Popis: | At the end of the 1960s, the U.S. divorce laws underwent major changes and the divorce rate more than doubled in all of the states. The new laws introduced unilateral divorce in most of the states and changes in divorce settlements in every state, such as property division, alimony transfers, and child custody assignments. The empirical literature so far has focused on the switch from consensual to unilateral divorce and found that this change cannot fully account for the increase in the divorce rate. Also, the divorce rate increased even in states where the decision remained consensual. In this paper, I consider the effects of other aspects of the legal change. I show that changes in divorce settlements provide economic incentives for both spouses to agree to divorce. Moreover, I describe a mechanism that can explain the different change in divorce rate by age of couples. I solve and calibrate a model where agents differ by gender, and make decisions on their marital status, investment and labor supply. Under the new financial settlements, divorced men gain from a favorable division of property, while women gain from an increase in alimony and child support transfers. Since both of them are better off in the new divorce setting, the existing requirement of consent for divorce (consensual or unilateral) is no longer relevant. Results show that changes in divorce settlements account for a substantial amount of the increase in the aggregate divorce rate. I also find that the increase in divorce rate of young couples with children contributes the most to the overall increase, which is consistent with the data. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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