The normality of error
| Autor: | Sam Carter, Simon Goldstein |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Philosophy of mind
justification agglomeration appearance and reality preface Computer science media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Appeal Metaphysics Internalism and externalism 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 050105 experimental psychology Epistemology Philosophy of language Philosophy normality Perception 060302 philosophy 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences knowledge first Normality media_common Simple (philosophy) |
| Zdroj: | Philosophical Studies. 178:2509-2533 |
| ISSN: | 1573-0883 0031-8116 |
| Popis: | Formal models of appearance and reality have proved fruitful for investigating structural properties of perceptual knowledge. This paper applies the same approach to epistemic justification. Our central goal is to give a simple account of The Preface, in which justified belief fails to agglomerate. Following recent work by a number of authors, we understand knowledge in terms of normality. An agent knows p iff p is true throughout all relevant normal worlds. To model The Preface, we appeal to the normality of error. Sometimes, it is more normal for reality and appearance to diverge than to match. We show that this simple idea has dramatic consequences for the theory of knowledge and justification. Among other things, we argue that a proper treatment of The Preface requires a departure from the internalist idea that epistemic justification supervenes on the appearances and the widespread idea that one knows most when free from error. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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