Making sense of non-factual disagreement in science
| Autor: | Naftali Weinberger, Seamus Bradley |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Motivation
History media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Proposition 06 humanities and the arts Awareness Temptation 16. Peace & justice 050905 science studies 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Dissent and Disputes Focus (linguistics) Epistemology Trace (semiology) History and Philosophy of Science 060302 philosophy Scientific domain Sociology 0509 other social sciences media_common |
| Zdroj: | Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. 83:36-43 |
| ISSN: | 0039-3681 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.shpsa.2020.01.004 |
| Popis: | Philosophical discussions of disagreement typically focus on cases in which the disagreeing agents are aware that they are disagreeing and can pinpoint the proposition that they are disagreeing about. Scientific disagreements are not, in general, like this. Here we consider several case studies of disagreements that do not concern first-order factual claims about the scientific domain in question, but rather boil down to disputes regarding methodology. In such cases, it is often difficult to identify the point of contention in the dispute. Philosophers of science have a useful role to play in pinpointing the source of such disagreements, but must resist the temptation to trace scientific debates to disputes over higher-level philosophical accounts. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
Full Text from ScienceDirect