Defining 'mental disorder' in legal contexts
| Autor: | Jamie Walvisch |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
medicine.medical_specialty
Poison control World Health Organization Pathology and Forensic Medicine 03 medical and health sciences 0302 clinical medicine Terminology as Topic Forensic psychiatry Psychological Theory medicine Humans Mental Competency 030212 general & internal medicine Psychiatry Societies Medical Mental health law Mental Disorders Forensic Psychiatry Mental illness medicine.disease Mental health Rule of law Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Psychiatry and Mental health Normative Psychology Law Social psychology 030217 neurology & neurosurgery |
| Zdroj: | International Journal of Law and Psychiatry. 52:7-18 |
| ISSN: | 0160-2527 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.ijlp.2017.04.003 |
| Popis: | Despite its widespread use, the term “mental disorder” has proven remarkably difficult to define. This is of grave concern in those legal contexts which crucially depend on the classification of an individual’s mental health condition as a “mental disorder”. It creates a likelihood that individuals will be treated in an inconsistent and unprincipled fashion, which is unacceptable in a legal system which purports to operate under the rule of law. This article examines the way in which the term “mental disorder” should be defined in legal contexts. It critiques the approach taken by the two main psychiatric manuals currently in use (the DSM-5 and the ICD-10), as well as four suggested alternatives: Boorse’s biostatistical theory; Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction theory; Jaspers’ lack of meaningful connections approach; and the psychological view of mental disorder as maladaptive behavior. It recommends the adoption of a context-specific, purpose-based approach that focuses on the normative concerns of the law. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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