Unfair and Anomalous Evolutionary Dynamics from Fluctuating Payoffs
| Autor: | Frank Stollmeier, Jan Nagler |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
0301 basic medicine
Change over time Physics::Physics and Society Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory General Physics and Astronomy FOS: Physical sciences 01 natural sciences 03 medical and health sciences Game Theory 0103 physical sciences Economics Evolutionary game dynamics Quantitative Biology::Populations and Evolution Physics - Biological Physics 010306 general physics Evolutionary dynamics Quantitative Biology - Populations and Evolution Randomness Selection (genetic algorithm) Reproduction Stochastic game Populations and Evolution (q-bio.PE) Models Theoretical Biological Evolution 030104 developmental biology Biological Physics (physics.bio-ph) FOS: Biological sciences Mathematical economics |
| Zdroj: | Physical review letters. 120(5) |
| ISSN: | 1079-7114 |
| Popis: | Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. Reproduction depends on the payoff a strategy receives. The payoff depends on the environment that may change over time, on intrinsic uncertainties, and on other sources of randomness. These temporal variations in the payoffs can affect which traits evolve. Understanding evolutionary game dynamics that are affected by varying payoffs remains difficult. Here we study the impact of arbitrary amplitudes and covariances of temporally varying payoffs on the dynamics. The evolutionary dynamics may be "unfair", meaning that, on average, two coexisting strategies may persistently receive different payoffs. This mechanism can induce an anomalous coexistence of cooperators and defectors in the Prisoner's Dilemma, and an unexpected selection reversal in the Hawk-Dove game. 6 pages, 8 pages supplement |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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