Equilibrium non-existence in generalized games
| Autor: | Áron Tóbiás |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2022 |
| Předmět: |
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
Economics and Econometrics Computer science media_common.quotation_subject Hemicontinuity Convexity Interdependence symbols.namesake Compact space Action (philosophy) Simple (abstract algebra) Nash equilibrium symbols Generalized game Mathematical economics Finance media_common |
| Zdroj: | Games and Economic Behavior. 135:327-337 |
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2022.06.012 |
| Popis: | A generalized game is a strategic situation in which agents’ behavior restricts their opponents’ available action choices, giving rise to interdependencies in terms of what strategy profiles remain mutually feasible. This paper proposes a novel example of a simple generalized game in which the well-known convexity, compactness, continuity, and concavity assumptions are satisfied, but no Nash equilibrium exists. This finding reinforces that certain additional conditions appearing in the literature (primarily, the lower hemicontinuity of feasibility correspondences) are indispensable for equilibrium existence and must be considered as supplemental desiderata beyond the usual regularity conditions. Implications for institutional design are discussed. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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