Reining in the executive? Delegation, evidence, and parliamentary influence on environmental public policy
| Autor: | Tim Rayner, John Turnpenny, Duncan Russel |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2013 |
| Předmět: |
Government
Environmental audit Public Administration Delegation business.industry media_common.quotation_subject Geography Planning and Development Public policy Accounting Legislature Management Monitoring Policy and Law Environmental Science (miscellaneous) Public administration Regional policy Political science Delegation Theory Accountability business media_common |
| Zdroj: | Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy. 31(4):619-632 |
| Popis: | With this paper we explore the potential of committees in parliamentary systems of government to influence environmental public policy making. We draw on delegation theory to argue that parliamentary committees are crucial ex post mechanisms used by the legislature (the principal) to monitor the activities of the executive (its agent). To examine this relationship in depth, we focus on the United Kingdom’s Environmental Audit (select) Committee (EAC), which is an innovation as the world’s first cross-cutting environmental parliamentary committee. We find that delegation theory provides fresh insights into the relationship between the EAC, the legislature, the executive, and the wider public. We find that an incomplete system of delegation in the United Kingdom has left an accountability deficit, meaning that the EAC’s ability to exert influence on the executive’s environmental policy is limited. Keywords: parliamentary committees, environmental policy, delegation theory, evidence, policy influence |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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