Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
| Autor: | Yuanchuan Lien, Paul Milgrom, John H. Kagel |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2010 |
| Předmět: |
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Generalized second-price auction Mathematical optimization Auction theory jel:D44 TheoryofComputation_GENERAL Auction algorithm Revenue equivalence Combinatorial auction Microeconomics Bid shading Unique bid auction Economics Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction General Economics Econometrics and Finance |
| Popis: | We use theory and experiment to explore the performance of multi-round, price-guided, combinatorial auctions. We define efficiency-relevant and core-relevant packages and show that if bidders bid aggressively on these and losing bidders bid to their limits, then the auction leads to efficient or core allocations. We study the theoretically relevant behaviors and hypothesize that subjects will make only a few significant bids, and that certain simulations with auto-bidders will predict variations in performance across different environments. Testing the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) design, we find experimental support for these two hypotheses. We also compare the CCA to a simultaneous ascending auction. (JEL D44) |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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