International environmental negotiations: does coalition size matter?
| Autor: | Rutz, Samuel, Borek, Thomas |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2000 |
| Předmět: |
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
KOALITIONEN (INTERNATIONALE POLITIK) GRENZÜBERSCHREITENDE PROBLEME UND INTERNATIONALE ZUSAMMENARBEIT (UMWELTPOLITIK) TRANSBOUNDARY PROBLEMS AND INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION (ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY) COALITIONS (INTERNATIONAL POLITICS) FOS: Political science ddc:320 ddc:330 Political science |
| Zdroj: | Materialien / Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich, 2000 (20) |
| Popis: | This paper reconsiders a widely used game of coalition formation in international environmental negotiations. Due to the mathematical problems of giving a full characterization of the solution, up to now most of the work on this subject rested on numerical simulations to derive results. In this paper we show for a general class of payoff functions that when the game is approximated by assuming a continuum of players, a solution can be found. Using this result as a "benchmark solution", we further show that gains from cooperation resulting in simulations are due to an "integer effect", i.e. coalition size being treated as a discrete variable. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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