Optimal Conservation Programs, Asymmetric Information and the Role of Fixed Costs

Autor: Daan van Soest, Carmen Arguedas
Přispěvatelé: Spatial Economics, Environmental Economics, Research Group: Economics, Department of Economics, Tilburg Sustainability Center
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2011
Předmět:
Zdroj: Arguedas, C & van Soest, D P 2011, ' Optimal Conservation Programs, Asymmetric Information and the Role of Fixed Costs ', Environmental and Resource Economics, vol. 50, pp. 305-323 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9474-x
Environmental and Resource Economics, 50, 305-323. Springer Netherlands
Environmental and Resource Economics, 50(2), 305-323. Springer
ISSN: 1573-1502
0924-6460
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-011-9474-x
Popis: An increasing number of environmental protection programs offers financial compensation to farmers in exchange for conservation services. Incentive-compatible contracts can be designed to mitigate excess compensation, but the extant literature suggests that outcomes are always second-best so that other instruments (such as conservation auctions) may be preferred. We argue that the claim regarding the first-best solution never being incentive-compatible is correct if all conservation costs are variable in nature; if there are fixed costs too, the first-best compensation scheme may be incentive-compatible after all. Given the relevance of fixed costs in conservation issues, we conclude that incentive-compatible contracts should be given a second chance as a policy measure to induce conservation. © 2011 The Author(s).
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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