How to Infer What Persistent Things Are Up to
| Autor: | Johan Gersel |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2023 |
| Předmět: |
Health Policy
Philosophy 05 social sciences Inference 06 humanities and the arts Sense 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Frege's puzzle 050105 experimental psychology Epistemology Content Frege 060302 philosophy Frege's Puzzle 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Content (Freudian dream analysis) Demonstrative thought |
| Zdroj: | Inquiry. 66(1):92-121 |
| ISSN: | 1502-3923 0020-174X |
| Popis: | How do we inferentially unify separately acquired empirical information into a single comprehensive picture of the lives of persistent particulars? This paper argues that hidden in such inferences is a Fregean puzzle that can only be solved by individuating our demonstratives thoughts in terms of object-dependent Fregean Senses. I begin by characterizing some constraints on a non-skeptical account of our inferential unification of empirical information. I then go on to show that traditional Fregean views of Sense cannot explain the rationality of such inferences; the consequence of which would be widespread skepticism concerning fundamental aspects of our empirical worldview. I show how the theory of object-dependent Senses can account for the rationality of the puzzling inferences. Lastly, I consider the alternative that we abandon a Fregean explanation of the rationality of inferences. While not fully dismissing that option, I briefly raise, what I take to be, a daunting challenge that uniquely faces non-Fregean views of rational inference. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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