Resisting persuasion
| Autor: | Elias Tsakas, Nikolas Tsakas, Dimitrios Xefteris |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Microeconomics & Public Economics, RS: GSBE Theme Conflict & Cooperation, RS: GSBE Theme Human Decisions and Policy Design |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
m38 - Marketing and Advertising: Government Policy and Regulation
Economics and Econometrics d72 - Political Processes: Rent-seeking CHEAP TALK Lobbying Resistance PREFERENCE SUSCEPTIBILITY Elections and Illegal Behavior: General CONSISTENCY Legislatures Asymmetric and Private Information Mechanism Design and Voting Behavior Political Processes: Rent-seeking Search Learning Information and Knowledge Communication Belief the Legal System Money burning BAYESIAN PERSUASION d72 - Political Processes: Rent-seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting Behavior Uncertainty Legal Procedure k40 - Legal Procedure k40 - Legal Procedure the Legal System and Illegal Behavior: General PUBLIC COMMITMENT NORMATIVE INFLUENCE ATTITUDE CERTAINTY Marketing and Advertising: Government Policy and Regulation |
| Zdroj: | Economic Theory, 72(3), 723-742. Springer Verlag |
| ISSN: | 0938-2259 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00199-020-01339-0 |
| Popis: | In the context of Bayesian Persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow in Am Econ Rev 101:2590-2615, 2011), typically, a biased Sender designs a signal to influence the binary decision of an unbiased Receiver. Can the Receiver improve her payoffs by adopting a resistance strategy, i.e., by committing into incurring (deterministic or stochastic) costs if she picks the Sender-preferred action? We argue that deterministic resistance strategies cannot improve the Receiver's payoffs, whereas stochastic resistance strategies can increase both the informativeness of the signal and the Receiver's payoffs. We fully characterize the optimal resistance strategy and show that it always induces a substantial increase in the Receiver's welfare, as well as a perfectly informative signal. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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