Tiny wireguard tweak
Autor: | Appelbaum, Jacob R., Martindale, Chloe R., Wu, Sinli Peter, Nitaj, Abderrahmane, Rachidi, Tajjeeddine, Buchmann, Johannes |
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Přispěvatelé: | Discrete Mathematics |
Jazyk: | angličtina |
Rok vydání: | 2019 |
Předmět: |
Computer science
Post-quantum cryptography 050801 communication & media studies 02 engineering and technology Computer security computer.software_genre Encryption VPN Public-key cryptography 0508 media and communications 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering WireGuard Network protocol Protocol (object-oriented programming) Mass surveillance Vulnerability (computing) business.industry 05 social sciences Byte Adversary Privacy Security 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing Communications protocol business computer |
Zdroj: | Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2019-11th International Conference on Cryptology in Africa, Proceedings, 3-20 STARTPAGE=3;ENDPAGE=20;TITLE=Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2019-11th International Conference on Cryptology in Africa, Proceedings Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2019 ISBN: 9783030236953 AFRICACRYPT |
Popis: | We show that a future adversary with access to a quantum computer, historic network traffic protected by WireGuard, and knowledge of a WireGuard user’s long-term static public key can likely decrypt many of the WireGuard user’s historic messages. We propose a simple, efficient alteration to the WireGuard protocol that mitigates this vulnerability, with negligible additional computational and memory costs. Our changes add zero additional bytes of data to the wire format of the WireGuard protocol. Our alteration provides transitional post-quantum security for any WireGuard user who does not publish their long-term static public key – it should be exchanged out-of-band. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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