Strategic incentives when supplying to rivals with an application to vertical firm structure
| Autor: | Serge Moresi, Marius Schwartz |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Strategic complements Delegation media_common.quotation_subject Strategy and Management 05 social sciences Economics Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous) Tariff Cournot competition Vertical integration Microeconomics Oligopoly Incentive Downstream (manufacturing) 0502 economics and business Industrial relations Bertrand competition Economics 050207 economics Industrial organization media_common 050205 econometrics |
| Zdroj: | International Journal of Industrial Organization. 51:137-161 |
| ISSN: | 0167-7187 |
| Popis: | We consider a vertically integrated input monopolist supplying to a differentiated downstream rival. With linear input pricing, at the margin the firm unambiguously wants the rival to expand—unlike standard oligopoly with no supply relationship—for either Cournot or Bertrand competition. With a two-part tariff for the input, the same result holds if downstream choices are strategic complements, but is reversed for Cournot with strategic substitutes. We analyze vertical delegation as one mechanism for inducing expansion or contraction by the rival/customer. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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