Optimal emission taxation and the Porter hypothesis under Bertrand competition

Autor:	Flavio Delbono, Luca Lambertini
Přispěvatelé:	Flavio Delbono, Luca Lambertini
Rok vydání:	2021
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics Sociology and Political Science win-win solution Bertrand competition Green innovation Economics Porter hypothesis price competition Neoclassical economics Porter hypothesis green innovation emission taxation
Zdroj:	Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics. 93:755-765
ISSN:	1467-8292 1370-4788
DOI:	10.1111/apce.12338
Popis:	Is socially efficient taxation conducive to the win-win solution associated with the strong version of the Porter Hypothesis? Using a Bertrand duopoly yielding a continuum of Nash equilibria, we show that this is true for almost any level of environmental damage and equilibrium pricing strategy. We also prove that the only case in which no conflict arises between private and public incentives is where firms price at marginal cost. This finding suggests that coordination between environmental and competition authorities would be highly desirable.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
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