Autor:	Strausz, Roland
Jazyk:	angličtina
Rok vydání:	2005
Předmět:	D82 informed investors G24 informed investors optimal finance contracts partial information revelation ddc:330 optimal finance contracts partial information revelation
DOI:	10.5282/ubm/epub.13514
Popis:	This paper studies the structure of optimal finance contracts in an agency model of outside finance, when investors possess private information. We show that, depending on the intensity of the entrepreneur's moral hazard problem, optimal contracts induce full, partial, or no revelation of the investor's private information. A partial or nonrevelation of information is optimal, when it mitigates an undersupply of effort by the entrepreneur due to moral hazard.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::58af84be32c6d31ed35acbc1db4d1a1e Zobrazit plný text záznamu