Competition among volunteers

Autor: Mario Ferrero, Franco Cugno
Rok vydání: 2004
Předmět:
Zdroj: European Journal of Political Economy. 20:637-654
ISSN: 0176-2680
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.10.009
Popis: Volunteer labor is analyzed as a selfish, rational investment activity that people undertake to compete for rents, or prizes, auctioned off by a nonmarket, output-maximizing organization. The model is located at the intersection of the tournament and rent-seeking literatures and proves that, with identical risk-neutral individuals, only two prizes, and free entry, the organization will find it optimal to set the bottom prize at zero and thus promote a volunteer contest. A broad range of real-world examples is shown to fit well with the model.
Databáze: OpenAIRE