Dynamic R&D with spillovers: A comment
| Autor: | Florian Wagener, Grega Smrkolj |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Equilibrium, Expectations & Dynamics / CeNDEF (ASE, FEB) |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Control and Optimization Applied Mathematics 05 social sciences Control (management) Subgame perfect equilibrium Microeconomics Competition (economics) symbols.namesake Nash equilibrium 0502 economics and business symbols Economics 050207 economics Process innovation 050205 econometrics |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 73, 453-457. Elsevier |
| ISSN: | 0165-1889 |
| Popis: | Cellini and Lambertini [2009. Dynamic R&D with spillovers: competition vs cooperation. J. Econ. Dyn. Control 33, 568–582] study a dynamic R&D game with spillovers. This comment demonstrates that, contrary to what is claimed in their paper, the game is not state redundant and the open-loop Nash equilibrium is not subgame perfect. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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