Enforcing regulatory standards in stock pollution problems
| Autor: | Francisco Cabo, Carmen Arguedas, Guiomar Martín-Herrán |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Pollutant
Pollution Pollution standards non-compliance Economics and Econometrics media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Stackelberg differential games Management Monitoring Policy and Law Environmental economics prices versus quantities dynamic regulation 0502 economics and business Non compliance Differential game Damages Stackelberg competition 050202 agricultural economics & policy Business 050207 economics Enforcement Stock (geology) media_common |
| Zdroj: | UVaDOC: Repositorio Documental de la Universidad de Valladolid Universidad de Valladolid UVaDOC. Repositorio Documental de la Universidad de Valladolid instname |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jeem.2019.102297 |
| Popis: | Producción Científica We analyze optimal pollution standards and enforcement strategies in settings where environmental damages depend on accumulated pollution, and enforcement is socially costly. We assume that a regulator and a representative polluting firm interact in a Stackelberg differential game, and we specifically allow the firm to pollute above the limit, and pay the corresponding fine. A crucial element is how progressive the fine is with respect to the degree of non-compliance. Some of our results contradict the related literature on the control of stock pollutants under full-compliance. In particular, we find that setting standards dependent on the pollution stock (setting quantities) is preferred if fines are sufficiently non-linear; while setting fines dependent on the pollution stock (setting prices) is preferred if fines are linear or almost linear, and specially when the environmental problem is particularly harmful MEC-FEDER ECO2014-52343-P MEC-FEDER ECO2017-82227-P Junta de Castilla y León VA105G18, co-financed by FEDER funds Este trabajo forma parte del proyecto de investigación de la Junta de Castilla y León VA024P17 and VA105G18, co-financed by FEDER funds |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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