Voting correctly in lab elections with monetary incentives
Autor: | Rafael Treibich, Jean-Benoit Pilet, André Blais, Simon Labbé St-Vincent |
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Rok vydání: | 2014 |
Předmět: |
Election threshold
experiment Sociology and Political Science Spoilt vote district magnitude media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Ranked voting system correct voting 0506 political science Microeconomics Single non-transferable vote Contingent vote Voting 0502 economics and business 050602 political science & public administration 050207 economics Group voting ticket media_common Preferential block voting |
Zdroj: | Blais, A, Labbé St-Vincent, S, Pilet, J-B & Treibich, R 2016, ' Voting correctly in lab elections with monetary incentives : The impact of district magnitude ', Party Politics, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 544-551 . https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068814560933 |
ISSN: | 1460-3683 1354-0688 |
Popis: | Whether people make the right choice when they vote for a given candidate or party and what factors affect the capacity to vote correctly have been recurrent questions in the political science literature. This paper contributes to this debate by looking at how the complexity of the electoral context affects voters’ capacity to vote correctly. Correct voting is defined as a vote that maximizes one’s payoffs in lab elections with monetary incentives. We examine two aspects of the electoral context: district magnitude and the distribution of preferences within the electorate. The main finding is that the frequency of correct voting is much higher in single-member than in multi-member district elections. As soon as there is more than one single seat to be allocated, voters have more difficulty figuring out whether they should vote sincerely for their preferred party or opt strategically for another party in order to maximize their payoffs. By contrast, the distribution of preferences within the electorate has no significant effect. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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