A theory of elite-biased democracies

Autor: Raouf Boucekkine, Paolo Melindi-Ghidi, Rodolphe Desbordes
Přispěvatelé: EconomiX, Université Paris Nanterre (UPN)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques (AMSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Institut de recherches économiques et sociales (UCL IRES), Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain (UCL), SKEMA Business School, ANR-17-EURE-0020,AMSE (EUR),Aix-Marseille School of Economics(2017), SKEMA BS, Université Côte d'Azur (UCA), This work was supported by the French National Research Agency Grant ANR-17-EURE-0020., École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU), Lhuillier, Elisabeth, Aix-Marseille School of Economics - - AMSE (EUR)2017 - ANR-17-EURE-0020 - EURE - VALID, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales (IRES)
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2021
Předmět:
inequality
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking
Lobbying
Elections
Legislatures
and Voting Behavior
Sociology and Political Science
media_common.quotation_subject
institutional change
Population
Autocracy
Insider
Politics
revolution
minority/majority
Political science
0502 economics and business
Democratization
[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
education
economic favouritism
General Psychology
050205 econometrics
media_common
elite-biased democracy
JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games
education.field_of_study
05 social sciences
General Social Sciences
Redistribution (cultural anthropology)
16. Peace & justice
[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
Democracy
Political economy
Elite
050206 economic theory
Statistics
Probability and Uncertainty
Zdroj: Mathematical Social Sciences
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, 2021, 112, pp.159-166. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.03.007⟩
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2021, 112, pp.159-166. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.03.007⟩
HAL
ISSN: 0165-4896
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.03.007⟩
Popis: Elite-biased democracies are those democracies in which former political incumbents and their allies coordinate to impose part of the autocratic institutional rules in the new political regime. We document that this type of democratic transition is much more prevalent than the emergence of pure (popular) democracies in which the majority decides the new institutional rules. We then develop a theoretical model explaining how an elite-biased democracy may arise in an initially autocratic country. To this end, we extend the benchmark political transition model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) along two essential directions. First, population is split into majority versus minority groups under the initial autocratic regime. Second, the minority is an insider as it benefits from a more favourable redistribution by the autocrat. We derive conditions under which elite-biased democracies emerge and characterise them, in particular with respect to pure democracies.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.03.007
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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