The transfer system in European football: A pro-competitive no-poaching agreement?
Autor: | Thomas Peeters, Francesco Principe, Sam Hoey |
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Přispěvatelé: | Applied Economics, Tinbergen Institute |
Jazyk: | angličtina |
Rok vydání: | 2021 |
Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Antitrust Inequality Strategy and Management media_common.quotation_subject Economics Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous) Distribution (economics) Football Settore SECS-P/02 - Politica Economica No-poaching Revenue redistribution Transfer system European football Market economy Transfer market 0502 economics and business Revenue Asset (economics) 050207 economics 050205 econometrics media_common biology business.industry 05 social sciences Euros SDG 10 - Reduced Inequalities biology.organism_classification Industrial relations Value (economics) Business |
Zdroj: | International Journal of Industrial Organization, 75(March 2021):102695. Elsevier Inc. |
ISSN: | 0167-7187 |
Popis: | We assess the proclaimed pro-competitive effects of the “transfer system”, the no-poaching agreement governing the European football (soccer) labor market. A major argument to legitimize this system is that transfer fees, which hiring clubs pay to release players from their current clubs, redistribute revenues from large market to small market clubs. This would strengthen small clubs’ financial clout and their ability to compete in sporting terms. Player transfer fees represent over 10 billion Euros in asset value in the financial statements of the 202 clubs we analyze. Still, small market clubs rarely obtain substantial revenues from the transfer market. The main beneficiaries are clubs around the middle of the market size distribution. A select group of large market clubs makes significant transfer losses, but this does not undo their initial financial advantage. Overall, the transfer system therefore leads to a very minor reduction in revenue inequality. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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