Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Quantity Discounts and Private Information
| Autor: | Daniel Müller, Fabian Herweg |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2013 |
| Předmět: |
Preisdifferenzierung
Marktstruktur Economics and Econometrics asymmetric information input markets quantity discounts price discrimination screening vertical contracting Vertical Contracting L42 Tariff Markteintritt Price discrimination jel:D43 Quantity Discounts Microeconomics Asymmetric Information InputMarkets Price Discrimination Screening Monopolistic competition jel:L42 Information asymmetry Downstream (manufacturing) ddc:330 Economics Private information retrieval Wholesale price index Ex-ante input markets L11 Wohlfahrtsanalyse Asymmetric Information InputMarkets Quantity Discounts Price Discrimination Screening Vertical Contracting Vorleistungen jel:L11 Lieferantenmanagement D43 Theorie |
| Zdroj: | The Economic Journal. 124:776-804 |
| ISSN: | 0013-0133 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/ecoj.12061 |
| Popis: | We consider a monopolistic supplier’s optimal choice of wholesale tariffs when downstream firms are privately informed about their retail costs. Under discriminatorypricing, downstream firms that differ in their ex ante distribution of retail costs are offered different tariffs. Under uniform pricing, the same wholesale tariff is offered to all downstream firms. In contrast to the extant literature on thirddegree price discrimination with nonlinear wholesale tariffs, we find that banning discriminatory wholesale contracts—the usual legal practice in the EU and US— often is beneficial for social welfare. This result is shown to be robust even when the upstream supplier faces competition in the form of fringe supply. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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