Cooperating elephants mitigate competition until the stakes get too high
Autor: | Joshua M. Plotnik, Li-Li Li, Estelle Meaux, Rui-Chang Quan, Shang-Wen Xia |
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Jazyk: | angličtina |
Rok vydání: | 2021 |
Předmět: |
Primates
Male Competitive Behavior QH301-705.5 Economics Elephants Social Sciences General Biochemistry Genetics and Molecular Biology Ranking (information retrieval) Competition (economics) Market economy Elephas Reward Animals Psychology Biology (General) Chimpanzees Cooperative Behavior Mammals Behavior General Immunology and Microbiology biology Animal Behavior Behavior Animal General Neuroscience Rank (computer programming) Organisms Biology and Life Sciences Eukaryota Industrial Organization Cognition Collective Animal Behavior biology.organism_classification Joint action Social Dominance Competitive behavior Animal Sociality Vertebrates Amniotes Bonobos Monopolies Apes Female General Agricultural and Biological Sciences Monopoly Zoology Research Article |
Zdroj: | PLoS Biology PLoS Biology, Vol 19, Iss 9, p e3001391 (2021) |
ISSN: | 1545-7885 1544-9173 |
Popis: | Cooperation is ubiquitous in the animal kingdom as it aims to maximize benefits through joint action. Selection, however, may also favor competitive behaviors that could violate cooperation. How animals mitigate competition is hotly debated, with particular interest in primates and little attention paid thus far to nonprimates. Using a loose-string pulling apparatus, we explored cooperative and competitive behavior, as well as mitigation of the latter, in semi-wild Asian elephants (Elephas maximus). Our results showed that elephants first maintained a very high cooperation rate (average = 80.8% across 45 sessions). Elephants applied “block,” “fight back,” “leave,” “move side,” and “submission” as mitigation strategies and adjusted these strategies according to their affiliation and rank difference with competition initiators. They usually applied a “fight back” mitigation strategy as a sanction when competition initiators were low ranking or when they had a close affiliation, but were submissive if the initiators were high ranking or when they were not closely affiliated. However, when the food reward was limited, the costly competitive behaviors (“monopoly” and “fight”) increased significantly, leading to a rapid breakdown in cooperation. The instability of elephant cooperation as a result of benefit reduction mirrors that of human society, suggesting that similar fundamental principles may underlie the evolution of cooperation across species. This study shows that in a task requiring coordinated pulling, elephants compete for access to food but work to mitigate competition in order to maintain cooperation. If the cost of competition becomes too high, however, cooperation breaks down entirely. This behavior mirrors that seen in humans and other great apes, suggesting that certain cooperative mechanisms are not unique to primates. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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